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Abstract: We study China’s organization and governance of innovation in this paper from a policy 
foresight perspective. With its experience of planning systems, China resorts to state intervention in 
economic and social activities, which profoundly includes research and innovation. The government 
organizes and governs a vast national science and technology system, most of which is in the state sector, 
demonstrating the importance and relevance of its research and innovation policy. In this study, 343 
innovation policy items, collected in our sample for the period 1990 and 2013, have been scrutinized in a 
three dimension analytical framework for policy instruments, objectives and implementation. We then 
abstract and conceptualize the results and findings arrived at the study. Targeted and general purpose 
policy instruments are categorized. Patterns have emerged revealing the linkages between the targeted 
policy instruments and the policy objectives. The results and findings based conceptualization 
contributes to innovate the thinking in innovation policy configuration to advance national innovation 
constructs.  
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1. Introduction and background of study 
Technological advance and innovative application of science is pivotal to economic growth. 
‘Science and technology (S&T) give capital a power of expansion independent of the given 
magnitude of the capital actually functioning’, Marx maintained (Marx, 1867, p418). 
Schumpeter (1942) conceived creative destruction from exploring Marx’s analysis of 
bourgeois society, its relations of production and means of production and of exchange. The 
process of creative destruction ‘incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one (Schumpeter, 
1942, p83). Henceforth one of the major driving forces for economic development is 
innovation and the associated research and development (R&D), while innovation policy 
fosters R&D 1 . We pay attention to China’s innovation policy that is instrumental to 
implementing medium to long-term S&T planning frameworks specifically in this study, 
given its status as the largest emerging economy and the second largest economy in the 
world. Moreover, with its experience of planning systems, China resorts to state 
intervention in research and innovation. The government organizes and governs a vast 
national science and technology system, most of which is in the state sector. Nonetheless, 
national planning in science, technology and innovation (STI) fields is not unique to China; 
it’s not unique to the former planning economies either. As early as in the 1980s, Roessner 
(1985) examined the efforts in the US to initiate and implement a national innovation policy, 
though his assessment of the prospects for a national innovation policy was rather negative 
at the time. Sokolov and Chulok (2016) studied Russia’s priorities for future innovation, and 
claimed that after the crisis of late 1990s, the government declared S&T as one of national 
priorities and started increasingly investing in this sector. A number of policy instruments 
have been introduced to increase the efficiency of STI policies. One of them is S&T 
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Foresight. Li et al. (2017) specifically presented technology foresight in China, which was 
claimed to have received increasing attention in China among academic scholars and 
leopolicy makers. ‘… this large emerging country requires science and technology 
strategies to realize advancing development based on innovation’ (ibid, p246). In general, 
innovation policies of the European Union (EU) and its assessment of, and influence, on 
national innovation systems, policies and performance are pervasive. 
China was the largest emerging economy included in the Bloomberg top 30 most 
innovative countries in 2015, where China was ranked 22 overall, up from 25 in 2014 
(Bloomberg, 2015). Moreover, China was ranked number one in Manufacturing Capability 
among the Bloomberg top 30 most innovative countries in 2014 (Bloomberg, 2014). In 
seven contributing factors2 to global innovators, China was ranked top ten in other three 
factors, in addition to Manufacturing Capability. Coupled with its size, the impact and 
influence of China on the world economy and global innovative capacity are considerable. 
Now, not fast but sustainable economic growth and development in China is more crucial, 
not only for China but also for the world in an interwoven global economy. China cannot 
achieve sustainable economic growth and development by remaining the workshop of the 
world. Indeed, China’s manufacturing capacity, which has turned into excess in many fields, 
is more a problem for, rather than a solution to, further development. China has to renovate 
its means of production, the way in which production is organized and products are 
developed. China has made every effort to transit to an economy modeled on the west at the 
early stage of transformation, typified by former planning economies and emerging 
economies. It endured a planning economic system for the large portion of its post 
revolution period; and the tradition and practice under the planning system remain deeply 
in its institutions and governance protocols. This is in stark contrast to the west 
represented by US, Western Europe and Japan who have dominated the world’s innovation 
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landscape, which is compounded by the imparity in the innovation literature between 
emerging economies and the west and a time lag in research. China has transformed into a 
market-oriented economy to a certain extent but ‘intervened so systematically and 
invasively in their innovation system’ (Liu et al., 2011, p918). Research on China’s 
innovation and innovation policy is rare and needs to be bridged by the dominant western 
literature. Thus Huang et al. (2004) have utilized policy practices in the OECD countries as 
a guideline to examine China’s innovation policy in five categories: reform in the public S&T 
institutions, financial policy, business innovation support structure, human resource policy 
and legislative actions. Indeed, OECD is one of the major sources for documenting China’s 
innovation and innovation policy, and OECD (2008) has detailed China’s R&D and 
innovation in state research institutes and higher education institutions and presented the 
evolution of China’s S&T systems. The present paper is a focused study on China’s 
innovation policy, the examination of which fills a gap in the literature, producing 
comparable corroborated evidence for China to contrast with the practice and corroborated 
evidence of the west readily available in the literature. Being the largest, most powerful 
emerging economy and R&D engine, China has been proactively integrating the rest of the 
world at this stage of development, which has become increasingly assertive. Specifically, 
our study maps innovation policy objectives with innovation policy instruments and 
implementation in a three dimensional analytical framework, which enriches general 
innovation studies and general policy studies. It is a timely study of China’s innovation 
policy while its innovation activity is making impact beyond the national borders.    
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the prior studies, 
which is centered on research design for the present study in a three policy dimension 
analytical framework, substantiated with the analysis of reviewed studies. It is followed by 
research design for the execution of the empirical work, introducing our samples and 




implement the empirical work in conformity to the theoretical framework, analyzing the 
results that across the three policy dimensions. The final section concludes this study.   
 
2. Theoretical framework – policy instruments, objectives and implementation for 
innovation 
A policy in general is a set of principles to guide decisions and direct actions to achieve 
rational outcomes. Policy and policy studies, concerned with the pursuit of goals and 
objectives, take on matters from foresight or futures perspectives; whereas policy makers set 
to achieve policy goals and objectives by implementing policy instruments. ‘That is, when 
an instrument is selected to achieve a particular public purpose, what implementation 
problems are presented?’ (Peters, 2000, p41). While it has always been the case that policy 
instruments have to be implemented to achieve policy objectives, recent studies such as 
Peters (2000) and Nill and Kemp (2009) make policy implementations explicit. This is 
particularly valuable for assessing the effectiveness of policy instruments, because 
‘discussions about the relative merits of policy instruments are often conducted as if they 
were self-implementing and administration was irrelevant to their success or failure’ (Peters, 
2000, p36). The additional two dimensions of ‘problem – constraints’ in Nill and Kemp 
(2009) can be fittingly considered to be the implementation problem in Peters (2000). 
Therefore, this study is carried out with a three-dimension framework for policy objectives, 
policy instruments and policy implementation. 
Policy instruments are the most concrete among three policy dimensions; they are 
the carrier of policy. ‘The choice of policy instruments constitutes a part of the formulation 
of the policy, and the instruments themselves form part of the actual implementation of the 
policy’ (Borrás and Edquist, 2013, p1513). Bemelmans-Videc et al. (1998) offer a 
comprehensive analysis of categories and typologies of policy instruments. It presents 




economic means or subsidies (carrots), and information campaigns (sermons) (ibid, pp10-12). 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) classify policy instruments into three types, namely, supply 
side, environmental side, and demand side instruments. With regard to innovation policy, 
the typology of Edler et al. (2013) distinguishes between supply side instruments and 
demand side instruments, the former influences innovation generation and the latter 
influences those requesting, buying or applying innovations (p1). ‘There is strong 
theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that demand is crucial for innovation activities’ 
(Edler, 2013, p2). The EU has stressed the role of demand side measures, policies and 
measures to foster the market uptake of innovations, in recent years. The Communication of 
the European Commission (EC) on ‘Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union’ 
highlights that: ‘The potential of the single market should also be activated through policies 
that stimulate the demand for innovation, starting with an effective competition policy’ (EC, 
2010, P15). It points out: ‘Whereas most previous EU policy initiatives have focused on 
supply side measures which tried to push innovation, demand side measures give markets a 
greater role in “pulling” EU innovation by providing market opportunities’ (ibid). Demand 
side innovation policy tools and measures complement supply side innovation policy tools; 
therefore, effective links between them should be established, maintained and developed. 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World 
Bank take the similar stance. ‘In recent years, OECD countries from Finland to Australia 
and emerging economies such as China and Brazil have used more targeted demand side 
innovation policies such as public procurement, regulation, standards, consumer policies and 
user led innovation initiatives, as well as “lead market” initiatives, to address market and 
system failures in areas in which social needs are pressing’ (OECD, 2011, p9). ‘This interest 
in demand side innovation policy has emerged as part of a greater awareness of the 





It seems that the recent emphasis on demand side instruments has over reacted to 
‘correct’ the traditional reliance on supply side policy instruments, which makes the 
boundary between demand side and supply side instruments more blurred, as some policy 
instruments can’t be simply ‘pushing’ or ‘pulling’. In this sense, the three-category 
classification by Rothwell and Zegveld (1981) prevails in accommodating the tributes and 
features of various policy instruments. Therefore, we adopt demand side, supply side, and 
environmental side policy instruments as the three major policy instrument categories in 
this paper. Accommodating both ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ ingredients to varied degrees, 
environmental side instruments campaign to foster innovation by providing a regulative 
and infrastructural environment for all kinds of innovation activities and, among them, 
innovation diffusion which bridges innovation generation and innovation adoption. While 
supply side instruments attempt to push innovation by supporting innovators for 
innovation generation and outwards diffusion, demand side instruments aim at pulling 
innovation by creating market opportunities for innovation adoption and inwards diffusion. 
Based on the above deliberation, this categorization is generic and applicable generally to 
the developed and developing economies, with some economies paying more attention to 
demand side policy instruments while some others relying more on supply side instruments 
or valuing environmental side instruments specifically. It is expected that planned 
economies resort to supply side policy instruments primarily, while there is a greater role 
for the market to play in capitalist economies.  
We elaborate further on the categorization of policy instruments with examples and 
in the above analytical framework. Tax incentives scheme is accordingly environmental, 
incentivizing innovation creation and helps innovation diffusion to benefit innovation 
adoption which is broader than the demand side measure of ‘market uptake of innovation’. 
These include reduced corporate income tax rate for new and high technology enterprises, 




exemption or reduction on income derived from qualified technology transfer, different 
corporate income tax holidays for software and integrated circuit enterprises. Enterprises 
gain from operating in such environments, to speed up innovation diffusion and pass certain 
benefit onto innovation adoption through lowering product prices. The latter achieves the 
similar effect of a demand side measure for reducing tax payment on innovation products, 
but it is indeed originated on the supply side and fostered in such a pro innovation 
environment. Collaboration mechanisms are demand side as if an internal market is created 
to pull innovation by providing market opportunities, which is the measure promoted by the 
EC (Suriñach et al., 2011). For instance, collaboration between industry, HE institution and 
R&D institution is to promote commercialization of innovation and R&D products and to 
make it easy for innovation adoption by the industry and business firms.  
Policy objectives are specific and measurable while policy goals are broad and 
general. To organize innovation policies into typologies, Edler et al. (2013) have reviewed a 
total of 1402 reference items, including 197 evaluation reports, 584 academic analyses with 
evaluation evidence, and 621 other documents. They have identified seven major innovation 
policy goals through synthesizing the key findings and insights in these reports and 
documents. These goals are: (1) increasing research and development investment; (2) 
augmenting skills; (3) enabling access to expertise; (4) strengthening system-wide 
capabilities and exploiting complementarities; (5) enhancing innovation demand; (6) 
improving frameworks for innovation, including regulation and standards; and (7) 
facilitating exchange and dialogue about innovation (p1). They present the goals and their 
degrees of relevance to a range of demand side and supply side instruments (ibid, p7). With 
specific reference to innovation voucher schemes, the stated policy goals in Flanagan et al. 
(2011) are: (1) stimulating/raising level of demand for R&D in firms; (2) supporting R&D 
performing institutions; (3) promoting collaboration; (4) making public R&D more 




same region. Suriñach et al. (2011) point out: ‘It is important to notice, in fact, that the IM 
(Internal Market) regulations designed by the European Commission are generally aimed at 
achieving specific objectives which usually abstract from the direct goal of fostering 
innovation adoption or creation’ (p99). There is the vast literature on diffusion of 
technology, innovation and/or R&D, and Suriñach et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive 
review of the diffusion/adoption literature, as well as empirical evidence. They reveal that: 
‘Generation of innovation would be mainly driven by some sectors and then adopted in 
other sectors’ (ibid, p44). Pierce and Delbecq (1977) define ‘innovation is a process including 
three stages: generation, acceptance, and implementation’ (p29). Synthesizing the above 
goal of fostering innovation adoption or creation with the diffusion literature and the stages 
conjecture of innovation, (fostering) generation of innovation, diffusion of innovation, and 
adoption of innovation are adopted as the three broad innovation policy goals in this study, 
into which specific policy objectives are categorized. 
Policy implementation ‘is what develops between the establishment of an apparent 
intention on the part of government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the 
ultimate impact in the world of action’ (O’Toole, 2000, p264). ‘Policy implementation as a 
field of scholarly inquiry and practical recognition has come and gone like an elusive sprit’ 
(deLeon and deLeon, 2002, p467), because ‘it was either too difficult to study or, conversely, 
too simple (ibid, p469). Thus, the implementation issue or dimension is either circumvented 
– being too difficult, or ignored – being too simple, in much of actual policy research. 
deLeon and deLeon (2002) examine three generations of policy implementation theory 
research. The first generation of implementation studies usually consisted of case study 
analyses that considered the immense vale of troubles that lay between the definition of a 
policy and its execution (ibid, 469). The second generation ‘… assumed a command and 
control orientation, … known as a top-down perspective’, … and ‘an alternative 




models are mostly recognized but have met much criticisms; now they have rarely been 
adopted in practice and only mentioned as a theory in textbook materials. The third 
generation ‘sought to explain “why behavior varies across time, across policies, and across 
units of government and by predicting the type of implementation behavior that is likely to 
occur in the future”’ (ibid, p471). Contingency theories are typical of the third generation of 
implementation research. Matland (1995) has proposed a kind of contingency model with 
two dimensions of ambiguity and conflict. ‘Four implementation perspectives are developed 
in the ambiguity/conflict model, based on a policy’s ambiguity and conflict level’ (ibid, p155). 
His model draws extensively on the work of organizational theorists and decision-making 
scholars, along the line of Sorg (1983) who has recognized ‘the contributions of institutional 
and policy characteristics to the success, failure, or modification of policies’ (p391). 
Developing further the two by two general typology of Sorg (1983) for policy 
implementation, Matland (1995) exhibits the four implementation processes or perspectives 
in the four cells in the conflict-ambiguity matrix. The first is named ‘administrative 
implementation’ with low policy ambiguity and low policy conflict. ‘The central principle in 
administrative implementation is outcomes are determined by resources’ (ibid, p160). The 
second is ‘political implementation’ with low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict. ‘The 
central principle in political implementation is that implementation outcomes are decided by 
power’ (ibid, p163). The third is ‘experimental implementation’ with high policy ambiguity 
and low policy conflict. ‘The central principle driving this type of implementation is that 
contextual conditions dominate the process’ (ibid, pp165-166). Lastly, there is ‘symbolic 
implementation’ where both levels of policy ambiguity and policy conflict are high. ‘The 
central principle is that local level coalition strength determines the outcome’ (ibid, p168). 
Reviewing the OECD science policy-making model, Henriques and Larédoc (2013) suggest 
that ‘OECD science policy reviews in the 1960s addressed the issue of how, with whom and 




governments to favour knowledge production and exploitation linked to economic growth’ 
(p804). They stress that the OECD model ‘is centred on the creation of structures, actors 
and functions that enable the policy cycle to deploy in the field’ (ibid). It is revealed that, 
given the complexity in policy implementation and the need for reducing ambiguity and 
conflict in policy implementation, the institutional and policy characteristics have been 
considered to be paramount in theory and practice, with which we examine policy 
implementation in this study.  
 
{Figure 1 about here} 
 
We summarize the three dimensional theoretical and analytical framework with the 
help of Figure 1. It shows that the three policy dimensions are not identical; there is an 
expected causal relationship from policy instruments to policy objectives, and mediating 
effects of policy implementation for the fulfilment of policy objectives of policy instruments. 
Policies are issued and implemented to achieve policy objectives/goals. Therefore, a causal 
relationship is expected from policy instruments to policy objectives/goals for effective 
policies, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Meanwhile, policy issues’ characteristics and policy 
characteristics are expected to play a role in facilitating the fulfilment of policy 
objectives/goals of policy instruments in successful policy implementation. Broadly and 
conceptually, it is to mediate the fulfilment of policy objectives/goals of policy instruments, 
which is also illustrated by Figure 1. Studies of mediation effects of/in policy 
implementation at macro levels are rare, much of which has to be learned from institutional 
level research and case studies, usually with the former involving statistical inferences and 
the latter no statistical estimation. In this regard, Feiock et al. (2003) investigate the 
mediating role of governance institutions in US municipal reform – mayor-council 




government is often included as a variable in explanatory model’ (ibid, p619). One of the 
reasons is that ‘most research treats institutional effects as additive rather than interactive’ 
(ibid, p619); thereby they advocate the examination of interactive, mediating effects of 
governance institutions. Saleth and Dinar (2009) point out that ‘there is a clear value in 
developing a generic framework that can formally handle both the impact synergies and the 
development mediation roles of institutions within the same analytical framework’ (p924). 
In Wong and Li (2011), the benefits of information and communication technology on 
student learning is mediated by pedagogical and organizational factors, among others, in a 
school setting. Bearing the scarcity and difference in mind, we attempt to pursue a new line 
of inquiry into the mediation effect in policy implementation with the three dimensional 
analytical framework.  
 
3. Research design, samples and variables 
There were 343 policy items collected in our sample for the period 1990 and 2013. They 
were issued by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress, the legislature; the State 
Council, the executive; the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Commerce, 
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and other ministries that form the State 
Council; and non-cabinet departments and agencies. The policy variables describe policies in 
three dimensions of policy instruments, policy objectives/goals and policy implementation. 
Table 1 lists these policy variables with their narratives. The demand side policy 
instruments include three elements: public procurement, industry-HE institution-R&D 
institution collaboration, and international collaboration. There are four items included in 
the supply side: support for medium and small enterprises (MSEs) and small and micro 
enterprises (SMEs), fiscal support and subsidies, financial support, and human resources. 
The environmental side instruments consist of five items: administrative support, 




standards setting. With regard to policy objectives, there is one policy objective of S&T 
development for the innovation generation goal. There are two policy objectives of 
technological transformation and technical exports for the diffusion goal. The adoption goal 
includes two objectives: technical absorption and technical imports. On the policy 
implementation dimension, institutional characteristics are featured by legislature, which is 
the National People’s Congress of China; the executive is the State Council, and the 
ministries and departments that form the State Council; bureaus or agencies are non-cabinet 
government agencies and departments. Policy characteristics are reflected by the degrees of 
enforcement at five levels: laws, administrative regulations, measures, notifications and 
provisos.   
The coding of the policies and their representative variables is as follows. Dummy 
variables are adopted for all policy instruments and policy objectives. For example, ID1 is 1 
when a policy instrument is concerned with public procurement, 0 otherwise; GD2 is 1 
when a policy instrument addresses technical exports, 0 otherwise. For institutions, IC1, 
IC2 and IC3 are also dummy variables; IC1 is 1 when the policy is issued by the legislature, 
0 otherwise; the same coding is adopted for IC2 and IC3. The value of IC4, joint issue, is the 
number of entities who have jointly issued the policy. Policy characteristics are measured by 
degrees of enforcement of policies. PC1 is coded 5 when a policy is passed into law, 4 when a 
policy is administrative regulation, 3 for measures, 2 for notifications and 1 for provisos. 
Policy instruments are not mutually exclusive; e.g., a policy item for financial support can, 
at the same time, be on infrastructure support within the supply side. A policy item can also 
contain two or more instruments on different sides; e.g., a policy item for infrastructure on 
the supply side can also involve administrative support on the environmental side. The sum 
of percentages can therefore be over 100 percent. So are policy objectives; e.g., a policy item 
can be issued to achieve both objectives of technical imports and technical absorption. Since 




variables, e.g., it is a supply side instrument of financial support (IS3 = 1), its policy 
objective is technical exports (GD2 = 1) and it is issued by the executive (IC2 = 1). In 
addition, a policy item is reflected by two non-dummies, IC4 for the number of entities 
involved and PC1 for the degree of policy enforcement.  
 
{Table 1 about here} 
 
4. Mapping policy goals with policy instruments and implementation 
4.1. Policy, planning and foresight 
China’s innovation policy is the instruments to implement the national medium to long-
term planning for S&T, projecting the long-range prospects of S&T development, and 
setting guiding principles, development goals and overall deployments. Martin (2010) 
addressed the origins of the concept of ‘foresight’ in science and technology, originated in 
1983 in the renowned Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at University of Sussex.  
‘“Technology foresight” is a term now widely used by academic researchers, policy-makers, 
industrialists, consultants and others round the world’ indicated the association between 
foresight and policy (ibid, p1438). Miles (2010) provided a review of the development of 
technology foresight, which ‘took off in the 1990s, as European, and then other, countries 
sought new policy tools to deal with problems in their science, technology and innovation 
systems’ (p1448). These studies stipulated the association between the original concept of 
technology foresight and the practice in China, and the evolution from practice to theory, 
and then to practice again albeit at a higher level.   
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China 
launched the first Five-Year Plan in 1953 (National Planning Commission, 1955), which 
was adjusted to match calendar decades from the third Five-Year Plan that covered 1966-




planning over time. Its full title was the Five-Year Plan for Developing National Economy 
initially, and then changed to the Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development from the Seventh Five-Year Plan in 1986 onwards (People’s Net, 2017). 
Correspondingly there has been S&T planning since as early as 1955, because the 
attainment of economic goals is considered to be dependent on the development in S&T. 
The State Council set up a Science Planning Commission in 1955, assembling over six 
hundred scientists to compile the first such planning, Planning Framework for Long-Range 
Prospects in S&T Development (1956-1967), or The Twelve-Year S&T Planning (Ministry of 
Science and Technology, 2017). The latest was Planning Framework for National Medium to 
Long-Term S&T Development (2006-2020) (State Council, 2006a). In between, there were 
several other documents of S&T planning: Planning for S&T Development (1963-1972) 
compiled and implemented in 1963, Planning Framework for National S&T Development 
(1978-1985) in 1978, Planning for S&T Development (1986-2000) in 1982, Planning 
Framework for National Medium to Long-Term S&T Development together with Ten-Year 
Planning for S&T Development of People’s Republic of China and the Eighth Five-Year Planning 
Framework (1991-2000) implemented in 1992 (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2017). 
Since the Eleventh Five-Year Planning cycle in 2006, S&T planning has been aligned with 
economic and social planning. Such that Eleventh Five-Year Planning for National S&T 
Development was compiled and issued by Ministry of Science and Technology in 2006 and 
Twelfth Five-Year Planning for National S&T Development in 2011. Since Planning 
Framework for National Medium to Long-Term S&T Development (2006-2020) was issued in 
2006 just before Eleventh Five-Year Planning for National S&T Development, the latter was 
more about the concrete implementation of the former in the first five years. So far, Planning 
Framework for National Medium to Long-Term S&T Development (2006-2020) or S&T 




These plans and planning frameworks were aligned with the nation’s strategic goals 
of Four Modernizations, set forth formally for the first time by the then Premier Zhou Enlai 
in 1964 which encompass industry, agriculture, defense and science and technology (Zhou, 
1964), while its prototype was proposed 10 years before (Zhou, 1954). It was put forward in 
Planning for S&T Development (1963-1972) that ‘the modernization of science and 
technology is the key to achieving the modernizations in industry, agriculture, defense and 
science and technology’. It has been stressed that S&T is the forces of production, which 
was first formally phrased in Planning Framework for National S&T Development (1978-
1985), though ‘fully utilizing S&T achievements to raise social productive forces’, ‘utilizing 
daily upgrading technology to push rapid development in productive forces’ and so on were 
documented in all the previous S&T plans since 1956. These expositions presented the 
profound views of technological determinism, albeit historical materialism and dialectical 
materialism were in theory the guiding principles in the formulation of planning 
frameworks for economic, social and S&T development, to project and plan future 
development stages and phases and deal with complex or dialectical relations and 
interactions between various economic and social elements and forces.  
There have been several milestones in grand planning in foresight to realize Four 
Modernizations. The phrase ‘two bombs and one satellite’, i.e., the ability to make atomic 
bombs and hydrogen bombs and to launch artificial satellites into space orbits, had been 
grand future dreams since the 1950s, which became true on April 24, 1970 when China 
successfully launched its first artificial satellite ‘The East is Red 1’, following the successful 
nuclear weapon tests for an atomic bomb on October 16, 1964 and a hydrogen bomb on 
June 17, 1967. The next milestones were crewed spacecraft and the Lunar Exploration 
Program. Shenzhou 5 was successfully launched on October 15, 2003, carrying the 
astronaut Yang Liwei in orbit for 21 hours. Phase II of the Lunar Exploration Program for 




Chang'e 3 landed on the Moon on December 14, 2013, carrying the lunar rover Yutu; 
whereas Phase III entailing a lunar sample return mission was planned to be accomplished 
by 2020. All of these have been accompanied and made possible by the development in 
missile and rocket technologies. Many of S&T endeavors have been closely associated with 
or identical to military technologies, which materially helped foster the commercialization 
of military technologies for research establishments to stay profitable, one of the aspects to 
be addressed later in the present paper. China deployed top personnel and key resources for 
the fulfilment of Four Modernizations, especially the modernizations of defense 
(technologies) and S&T, by setting up a wide range of government- or military-run research 
institutes. The most renowned such establishments were the academies of the Ministry of 
Defense, including the Fifth Academy, Sixth Academy, Seventh Academy and Tenth 
Academy of the Ministry of Defense. The Fifth Academy was for the development of space 
technology and astronautic engineering, as well as tactical or short to medium range 
missiles; the Sixth Academy was for the development of aeronautical technology; the 
Seventh Academy was for shipbuilding, naval radar electronic warfare, underwater acoustic 
electronic warfare, and communications and navigation systems; and the Tenth Academy 
was for the development of military communications equipment. They became a dominant 
part of, or formed, the Ministry of the Seventh Machinery Industry, the Ministry of the 
Third Machinery Industry, the Ministry of the Sixth Machinery Industry, and the Ministry 
of the Fourth Machinery Industry, respectively. These ministries later assumed their 
explicit names in 1982 as Ministry of Astronautics Industry, Ministry of Aeronautics 
Industry, Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and Ministry of Electronics Industry.    
The above contextual exploration has presented the grand roadmaps for S&T 
advancement and supremacy. It has demonstrated how the government planned, directed 
and fine-tuned S&T activities in pursuit of its long-term goals of Four Modernizations to 




guiding principles, development goals, key tasks and overall deployments, presented 
roadmaps for industries, sectors and fields, which became more comprehensive over time. 
For example the latest S&T Planning Framework (2006-2020) identified key areas and 
priority themes, decided key special projects, technology frontiers and supported disciplines 
in fundamental research. New to Planning Framework (2006-2020) was the second part of 
Section VIII ‘Reform of the S&T Governance and the Assembly of National Innovation 
System’, a shift towards and an emphasis on innovation, which was deliberated earlier while 
the present study is aligned with. Fundamental policy guidelines and measures were 
addressed, the implementation of which was stipulated in an additional, separate document 
Supporting Policies for Implementing ‘Planning Framework for National Medium to Long-Term 
S&T Development (2006-2020)’ (State Council, 2006b). Covered in Supporting Policies were 
S&T input, tax incentives, financial support, public procurement, technical absorption, 
intellectual property, human resources, S&T bases and platforms, coordination between 
government departments in supporting innovation activities. These policy areas, together 
with those in previous planning frameworks over decades, are synthesized into policy 
variables and concealed in the present study. Policy instruments are the carrier of policy, 
implemented to achieve the envisaged policy goals. The development goals set in the 
medium to long-term planning framework are the grand goals, which will be realized 
through the implementation of a series of policies rolling out in sequence in perceived future. 
Thus mapping policy instruments with policy goals is a concrete step to assess the extent to 




The general innovation policy profile in China is summarized in Table 2, presenting the 




policies in that category, except the last two rows. The number of environmental side 
instruments was by far the largest, accounting for over 70 percent of total implemented 
policy instruments (62 percent after adjustments). Between supply side instruments and 
demand side instruments, the former were used predominantly relative to the latter. A very 
small number/percentage of demand side instruments were put forward, accounting for less 
than 5 percent of total implemented policy instruments (4 percent after adjustments); 
whereas supply side instruments comprised over 40 percent (34 percent after adjustments). 
Only recently demand side measures were considered and adopted to a modest extent that 
give markets a greater role in pulling innovation by providing market opportunities. 
Whereas supply side instruments still played a dominant role as they had traditionally done, 
pushing innovation by supporting innovators for innovation generation and outwards 
diffusion. China has been ambitious since 1949 so that innovation generation was always top 
on agenda of government policy, while innovation adoption was considered of secondary 
importance which was left with enterprises and markets. 
Table 3 and Figure 2 detail the issuances of innovation policies by year between 
1990 and 2013. It can be observed that policy issuances climaxed in the early 1990s and 
then in the second half of the first decade in the new millennium. The period 1990 – 2013 
can be divided into three sub-periods or stages according to China’s progress in reforms. 
The first stage was the structural reform of S&T systems from 1990 to 1994; the second 
was the deepening reform stage of S&T systems between 1995 and 2005; and the third was 
the creation of innovation systems since 2006. There were relatively fewer issuances of 
innovation policies in the second stage, which was to consolidate the fulfilments attained in 
the first stage with the old concept of S&T and R&D focusing on hardware build-ups. It was 
not until recently that innovation was put high on the agenda, which produced a new round 




measures rarely replaced the old ones; they opened up the new fields or augmented the old 
measures.        
{Table 2 about here} 
{Table 3 about here} 
{Figure 2 about here} 
 
 China valued the importance of environmental side instruments. It resorted to the 
environmental side instrument of administrative support considerably, accounting for 
approximately 46 percent of total implemented policy instruments. Instruments with 
intellectual property protection and tax incentives characters were also commonly used, 
accounting for around 11 percent. The supply side instruments instigating human resources 
accounted for more than a fifth of instruments in China, being the largest percentage among 
supply side policy instruments. Financial support was the second most frequently used 
supply side instruments with approximately a one tenth share, followed by fiscal support 
and subsidies.  
It has been demonstrated that China paid great attention to S&T development for 
the fulfilment of the objective of innovation generation, accounting for nearly 43 percent 
among all policy objectives. Transited from a planning economy and system, fundamental 
research traditionally enjoyed higher priorities, being dominated by the state sector. In 
contrast, technical diffusion and adoption of innovation were regarded less important, at 
least from the point of view of policy formation. These objectives were largely left for 
enterprises and R&D establishments to achieve for themselves. Nonetheless, China was 
keen on the commercialization of military technologies – transforming military technologies 
for commercial utilization to generate earnings. As such, technical transformation accounted 




Characteristically, China resorted to joint issues to strengthen policy 
implementation. There were 108 policies that were jointly issued by two or more entities, 
accounting for nearly one third of the total of 343 policies. The average number of 
government entities involved in joint issues of policies was 1.69. On the policy 
characteristics side, the degree of enforcement in China was low – many policies were 
measures, notifications and provisos, fewer were administrative regulation and laws passed 
by the National People’s Congress were rare.    
To provide an intuitive perspective on purposes of implemented policies, Table 4 
provides the preliminary statistics in terms of correlation matrix that exhibits the 
relationships between policy goals (disaggregated into policy objectives) and policy 
instruments and implementation. Given the data types in this study, Spearman's rank 
correlation method is employed for the estimation of correlation coefficients. As to a 
relationship to exist between a policy objective and a policy instrument, only a positive 
significant correlation matters for dummy variables; a negative significant correlation has 
the same meaning as insignificant correlations in this context – not related to each other. 
The relationship between a policy objective and policy implementation is handled in the 
same way. Notwithstanding for IC4, number of departments involved in issuing the policy 
jointly, a significantly negative correlation indicates the fewer, the more likely. It is the 
same for PC1, degree of enforcement, where a significantly negative correlation indicates 
the lower the degree, the more likely.    
 
{Table 4 about here} 
 
S&T development, the objective belonging to the goal of innovation generation, was 
of paramount importance in China. The supply side instrument of fiscal support and 




being positively significant at the 5 percent level. China further adopted the supply side 
instrument of financial support to achieve the objective of innovation generation, with the 
correlation coefficient being positively significant at the 5 percent level. China also made use 
of two demand side instruments of industry-HE institution-R&D institution collaboration 
and public procurement for innovation generation, though the linkage was at a lower 
significance level of 10 percent. With regard to the policy goal of innovation diffusion, 
China was pro-active in fulfilling the objective of technological transformation – primarily 
to transform military technologies for commercial utilization; the coefficient of an 
environment side instrument of standards setting that fostered commercialization processes 
was positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. China was keen on promoting 
technical exports and attempted to promote technical exports in a direct way by employing 
the supply side policy instruments of financial support and the environment side instrument 
of administrative support, with the coefficients being positively significant at the 1 percent 
and 10 percent respectively. China adopted two environment side instruments of 
administrative support and infrastructure support to promote technical absorption, with the 
correlation coefficients being positively significant at a modest level of 10 percent. China 
provided tax incentives for technical imports, with the coefficient of this environment side 
instrument being positively significant at the 1 percent level.     
Policy implementation helped achieve policy objectives/goals of policy instruments. 
According to the correlation matrix, China attempted to augment the attainment of 
technical absorption, technical imports and technical exports by joint issuances of policies, 
with the coefficients of IC4 with GA1, GA2 and GD2 being positively significant at the 5 
percent or 1 percent level. Given these preliminary statistics, we will test whether, how and 
the extents to which policy implementation variables mediate for the criterion of policy 





4.3. Results, analysis and discussion 
Analysis of the innovation policy profile and preliminary statistics provides a broad picture 
and certain clue about the relationships and interactions among the three policy dimensions. 
However, correlation matrixes are symmetric, treating the three policy dimensions 
identically. Thus, preliminary statistics and correlation coefficients cannot reveal the causal 
relationships from policy instruments to policy goals, which will be achieved by the means 
of regression analysis. Moreover, the discussion and analysis in the previous section indicate 
the need for examining the mediating role in policy implementation. We thereby carry out 
such research at this point. 
Mediating variables are important not only for identifying an indirect causal path, 
but also for detecting a missing direct causal path that would otherwise have vanished 
unnoticed. Many have turned a blind eye to the practical phenomena in testing mediating 
effects, the outcome of which does not conform to the conventional definitions of mediation 
and is largely ignored. MacKinnon et al. (2000) provide an excellent review of mediation, 
confounding and suppression effects with insightful discussion. One of the important points 
is that the mediating effect does not necessarily reduce the magnitude/significance of the 
coefficient for the direct route from the independent variable to the dependent variable; it 
may increase the magnitude/significance of the coefficient for the direct route. MacKinnon 
et al. (2000) call the latter a ‘suppressior variable’ (‘suppression effect’) (p175). In Breslow 
and Day (1980), the former is ‘positive confounding’ and the latter ‘negative confounding’ 
(p95). Mediation and confounding are identical statistically and can be distinguished only on 
conceptual grounds (MacKinnon et al., 2000, p173). For the sake of familiarity in the non-
statistics community, we label the former straight mediation and the latter augmenting 
mediation in this study. 
Logit binary choice models and Poisson count models are adopted for empirical 




nearly identical results as Logit models, though the results from Poisson count models and 
Logit models are close too. So the results from Poisson count models and Logit models are 
provided, analyzed and discussed. In the following, Table 5 reports the regression results 
from estimating Logit models; whereas Table 6 presents the results of Poisson count 
models. Same as the correlation analysis in the previous sub-section, only positively 
significant coefficients count for the variables’ contributions. Insignificant coefficients of 
instruments imply that they were not designed specifically for a single policy objective – 
generally encouraging or regulating innovation activities across a range of policy objectives. 
The two tables do not include the variables that are not applicable in estimation. Legislature 
(IC1) is excluded (as the base case for institutions), which is otherwise a function of 
complete linear combinations of executive (IC2) and non-cabinet departments (IC3).      
 
{Table 5 about here} 
{Table 6 about here} 
 
Let us inspect the instrument – objective/goal relationships, focusing on the 
mediated model in Table 5 and Table 6. The results from the simple model are contrasted to 
show the pitfall in neglecting mediation effects. Administrative support (IE1), fiscal support 
and subsidies (IS2), financial support (IS3) and tax incentives (IE5) were the dominant 
instruments to achieve specific policy objectives. To a less extent, infrastructure support 
(IE2), public procurement (ID1) and international collaboration (ID3) played a similar role. 
The only issuer/policy characteristic to mediate the fulfilment of policy objectives of policy 
instruments was the number of departments jointly issued the policy (IC4). Fiscal support 
and subsidies (IS2) and financial support (IS3) were identified as instruments aiming at 
promoting S&T development (GG1), confirming the previous preliminary analysis. The 




reported in Table 5.1. Financial support (IS3) was found to contribute to the policy 
objective of technical exports (GD2), with the coefficient being positively significant at the 1 
percent level in Table 5.3 and Table 6.3. The environmental side instruments were also 
implemented to assist technical exports, the coefficient for the administrative support 
variable (IE1) being positively significant at the conventional level. Standards setting (IE4) 
aimed at promoting transformation (GD1), the coefficients being positively significant at 
the 1 percent level for IE5 in Table 5.2 and Table 6.2. That is, the government primarily 
employed the environmental side and supply side instruments to promote innovation 
diffusion. While two environment side instruments of administrative support (IE1) and 
infrastructure support (IE2) aimed specifically at technical absorption (GA1), the 
environment side instrument of tax incentives (IE5) was used for promoting technical 
imports (GA2). The coefficients of IE1 and IE2 are positively significant at the 5 percent 
level in Table 5.4 and Table 6.4 for the former, and the coefficient of IE5 is positively 
significant at the 5 percent level in Table 5.5 and Table 6.5 for the latter. Additionally, two 
demand side instruments of public procurement (ID1) and international collaboration (ID3) 
were also implemented to assist technical imports, with the coefficients being positively 
significant at the modest level of 10 percent in Table 4.5 and Table 5.5. Such findings 
indicate that the government primarily employed the environment side and demand side 
instruments to encourage innovation adoption. It is interesting to note the augmenting 
mediating effect of the issuer/policy characteristic – joint issues (IC4). The coefficient of 
fiscal support and subsidies (IS2) becomes modestly significant after being mediated by joint 
issues. This evidence confirms the importance of mediating variables and effects for 
detecting a missing direct causal path from a policy instrument to a policy objective. 
It is noted that augmenting mediation effects of issuer/policy characteristics in 
policy implementation were more palpable than straight mediation effects. The coefficient of 




five policy objectives. In the case of technical absorption (GA1), the coefficient of fiscal 
support and subsidies (IS) becomes positively significant following the mediation of this 
policy characteristic, while the magnitude of the coefficient has increased as well. To a lesser 
extent, the coefficient of infrastructure support (IE2) increases in both significance and 
magnitude, being mediated by the joint issue variable. This observed effect is clearly an 
augmenting mediation effect, i.e., suppression effect in MacKinnon et al. (2000, p175), or 
negative confounding in Breslow and Day (1980, p95). In the cases of technical imports 
(GA2) and technical exports (GD2), while the coefficient of one policy instrument increases 
in magnitude, the coefficient of one other policy instrument decreases in magnitude. Both 
augmenting mediation effect and straight mediation effect are modest for these two policy 
objectives.   
 
5. Further discussion: implications, abstraction and conceptualization    
We abstract and conceptualize the results and findings arrived at in the previous section. To 
this end, Figure 3 is drawn to help demonstrate the relationships in a more integrated way 
than the tables. Illustrated in Figure 3 are the continuum for policy instruments on the left 
hand side and the continuum for policy objectives/goals on the right hand side. The 
creation of the instrument continuum and the objectives continuum and their mapping go 
an extra mile beyond the statistical analysis based on the results reported in Table 5 and 
Table 6. They contribute additionally to reconciling the both sides of the debate on the 
classification of supply and demand side instruments and the carving up of environmental 
instruments, and reflecting the changing degrees of innovation generation, diffusion and 
adoption in the classification of policy objectives/goals. The policy instruments showing up 
on the left side of Figure 3 are the instruments that possess positively significant 
coefficients in Table 5 and Table 6. Each of them has a causal relationship with one or more 




conjectures yet to emerge in the literature. We create two categories of policy instruments 
in this paper: targeted instruments and general purpose instruments. A targeted instrument 
has a specific policy objective(s) to achieve. Whereas a general purpose instrument comes 
across several policy objectives; it does not target a specific policy objective. As such, the 
coefficients of a targeted instrument are statistically significant with one or more policy 
objectives in the former, whilst the coefficients of a general purpose instrument are 
significant with none of the policy objectives in the latter.  
The supply side instruments are arranged on the top and the demand side 
instruments at the bottom, with the environmental instruments being in the middle. As 
indicated by the vertical arrow to the left of the policy instruments, the supply strength in 
the supply side instruments is the strongest on the top, diminishing downwards. Similarly, 
the demand strength in the demand side instruments is the most compelling at the bottom, 
diminishing upwards. Environmental instruments are carved and assigned to supply side 
and demand side instruments in a few prior studies, as some of them encompass the supply 
side elements and some others involve the demand side attributes to varied degrees. In this 
paper, the environmental instruments are ordered according to the extent to which they 
entail supply or demand side attributes. For example, administrative support (IE1) upholds 
the supply side attributes to the highest degree among all the environmental instruments in 
this study, followed by infrastructure support (IE2). On the other hand, the instrument of 
tax incentives (IE5) possesses much of demand side attributes and is sometimes assigned to 
demand side. Overall, the supply strength diminishes top down and the demand strength 
diminishes bottom up on such a continuum. 
Policy objectives/goals are arranged in the same way. On the top is innovation 
generation and at the bottom is total innovation adoption – technical imports (GA2). There 
is certain innovation generation in diffusion processes, especially in technical transformation 




innovation generation recedes gradually top down, so does the degree of innovation 
diffusion. On the other hand, innovation adoption can involve diffusion, such as in the 
process of technical absorption (GA1). There is overlapping in different policy objectives 
and goals and the arrows show such overlapping and the changing degrees of innovation 
generation, diffusion and adoption on continuums. 
Scrutinizing the linkages between the targeted policy instruments and policy 
objectives/goals, the following patterns emerge: a) innovation generation is typically 
targeted by the supply side instruments; b) innovation diffusion is typically targeted by the 
supply side instruments and environmental instruments; and c) innovation adoption is 
typically targeted by the environmental instruments and demand side instruments. Clearly, 
the supply strength is proportionate to the degree of innovation generation, and the demand 
strength is proportionate to the degree of innovation adoption. The environmental 
instruments augment both innovation diffusion and adoption but not innovation generation.   
We further reflect on these results, findings and implications by briefly reviewing 
China’s planning system and institutional evolution, with which China’s economic legacy 
and administrative processes bear its hallmark. China started the nationalization of 
industries in the mid-1950s, which was almost completed just before the launch of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966. One of the major reasons and purposes was to radically reform, 
if not to abandon, the orthodox Soviet planning system and approaches to economic 
management. Therefore, China did not possess a deep root in the planning economy and the 
root was shaken before it was planted firmed. In addition, with most people dwelling in 
rural areas, the reach of the planning system and state control in the economy had been 
limited and slack in China. The Cultural Revolution also influenced and predated the 
phenomenal transformation process since the 1990s, which was evident by a range of 
reformist ideas proposed in the ‘5.7 Instructions’, a letter circulated in 1966 in the run-up to 




corporations engage in agriculture and side-line production, and peasants set up and run 
small manufacturing factories collectively, whenever and wherever possible. The 
implications would be to take some economic activities out of the planning system and the 
state domain, setting to challenge state monopoly in the economy. The ‘5.7 Instructions’ 
was not socialist utopia, being indeed implemented a few years later. Elaborating it further, 
Mao indicated in 1972 that ‘Commune-brigade enterprises are the hope for rural economic 
development’ and then commune-brigade enterprises mushroomed in the east and southeast 
of China (State of the Province Archives of Fujian, 2006). They were the predecessors to the 
vibrant private and non-state sectors, being more innovative that the state sector, especially 
the central state sector. A new government agency, Bureau of Commune-Brigade 
Enterprises, was created in the early 1970s, in response to the need to better manage this 
rapidly growing sector. It was renamed Bureau of Township Enterprises in the 1980s. 
According to National Bureau of Statistics (1999), the average annual growth in output by 
rural township enterprises was as high as 28.5% between 1974 and 1978, before the widely 
promulgated reform and opening up period. The above indicated that China started the 
economic reform, which not only actually watered down the planning system and 
centralization, but also encouraged and tolerated collective enterprises and commerce as 
early as in the early 1970s. The rural ventures continued to burgeon. In a recent study, Wu 
et al. (2017) documented the link between social entrepreneurship and rural economic 
growth in China, promoted by the national innovation system. ‘Rural economic growth is 
associated with the adoption of new technology, and China's NIS facilitates that process’ 
(ibid, p247).   
Since Sino-Soviet split and the withdrawal of Soviet support and experts in late 
1950s and early 1960s, the government emphasized self-reliance in realizing Four 
Modernizations, the expression of aspiration to become one of the leading players on the 




S&T system and the pursuit of innovation generation and S&T supremacy, which seemed to 
be independent of and separate from the outside world. However, China, at the first 
opportunity, opened the door to the west, being symbolized by the visits to China of the US 
President Richard Nixon and Japan’s Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1972, mediated by a 
series of seemingly non-governmental but robust and innovative diplomacies, including the 
Ping-Pong (table tennis) diplomacy. In the 1960s and 1970s, China devoted tremendously 
to the third world countries especially in Africa, leading to the triumphant return of the 
PRC to the seat in the United Nations in 1971. In building the Tanzania-Zambia railways 
soon after their independence in 1965, China deployed huge national capacities including its 
most advanced machinery, equipment and technologies recently developed and 
manufactured in China, which China could hardly afford to use at home at the time. It has 
been indicated that China started innovation generation and even exported innovation at 
the stage when China was acquiring innovation and engaging in technical imports. This 
shows that innovation is global and global innovation is interrelated in dynamic, two-
directional traffic. China participated in globalization keenly since the 1970s, driving 
globalization in acceleration lately. Globalization brought about international convergence, 
which China involved in by adopting international standards and conventions passively in 
earlier decades, and then contributed to by influencing the making of international 
standards and conventions actively.  
 
{Table 7 about here} 
 
Indeed, China’s economic legacy in general and its innovation capacity in particular 
have benefited from the implemented reforms and global involvements starting in the early 
1970s. On the world stage and outside of China, all the visibles from China are the private 




innovation comprehensively and contrasted state and private innovation. This is evident by 
the fact presented in Table 7 that lists global most innovative companies for 2015 with two 
rankings. One is the Most Innovative Companies 2015 of the BCG (2015) and the other is 
the 50 Smartest Companies 2015 from MIT Technology Review (2015). The BCG ranking 
covers all kinds of companies while MIT Technology Review focuses on technology 
companies. It can be observed in the table that the private sector in China has made 
significant inroads into R&D and dominant contribution to China’s innovation capacity. 
There are three companies from China on the BCG list – Tencent, Huawei and Lenovo, 
ranked the 12th, 45th and 50th respectively. There are four companies from China on the 
MIT list – Xiaomi, Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu, ranked the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 21st respectively. 
All of them are private enterprises3. This fact points to the need of policy mapping and the 
study of policy mapping, given the prominence and supremacy of private sector innovation. 
The objectives of innovation, or any economic and business endeavor, won’t be effectively 
achieved by the means of administrative directives and executive instructions in the private 
sector as in the state sector in a planning economy and system. While administrative 
directives and executive instructions used to be the common and widely adopted ‘policy’ 
tools directed at the state sector in a planning economy in a direct manner, their value and 
appeal have been voided by the failure of the planning system practised so far. Henceforth 
policy mapping and the study of policy mapping are beneficial to both state and private 
innovation. Nonetheless, the state enterprises may have to work harder to relieve 
themselves from the habitat of obeying administrative directives and executive instructions, 
which to a certain extent contributed to the fact and difference that state enterprises are less 
innovative than private enterprises.   
 
                                               
3 None on the BCG and MIT ranking lists in Table 6 are China’s state enterprises, though Chinese Academy 
of Sciences Holdings (CAS Holdings or CASH) under the CAS currently has 34.85% shareholding in Lenovo 
(Legend Holdings, 2015). The state or the CAS is not involved in the running and strategic developments of 
Lenovo; they were not involved in Lenovo’s business matters even in the past when CAS Holdings had a 





In this paper we have studied China’s organization and governance of innovation from a 
policy perspective. In particular, we have examined China’s innovation policy in a three 
dimension analytical framework for policy instruments, objectives and implementation. S&T 
and/or innovation are of paramount importance in China, so is the study of innovation 
policy. It has been found that administrative support, fiscal support and subsidies, financial 
support and tax incentives are the dominant instruments targeting at specific policy 
objectives. Overall two thirds of policy instruments target at specific policy objectives, 
spreading between supply, demand and environmental side instruments, with the rest being 
general purpose. Our empirical results have enabled us to develop further theoretical 
conjectures to make a contribution to the literature. Specifically, a number of thought 
provoking findings and new concepts are summarized in the following, some of which are 
case specific, some others are of universal implications. 
Firstly, continuums for policy instruments and policy objectives/goals have been 
created in this study with universal implications. The creation of the instruments 
continuum contributes additionally to reconciling the both sides of the debate on the 
classification of supply and demand side instruments and the carving up of environmental 
instruments. Next, in mapping policy instruments and policy objectives/goals, patterns 
have emerged that in China, the supply side instruments target primarily innovation 
generation and then innovation diffusion, the demand side instruments typically target 
innovation adoption, and the environmental instruments augment both innovation diffusion 
and adoption. China has placed innovation generation top on agenda of government policy 
since 1949, while innovation adoption was considered of secondary importance which was 
left with enterprises and markets. Demand side measures were considered supplementary 
and adopted only recently to a modest extent. Thirdly, the state enterprises need to relieve 




and the policy makers need to rethink policy effectiveness in policy formulation and 
implementation, not only to reinvigorate state innovation but also to reinvent the national 
innovation system that integrate both the state and private sector. Last but not least, the 
importance of mediating variables and mediation is revealed from the perspectives of both 
statistical methodology and policy implementation. The case specific findings in this study 
may well impact the world in the near future if not now, given its sheer size of population 
and geography. How China and the rest of the world interact would have yet to be 
comprehended. While a piece of work on China’s innovation and innovation policy, the 
present paper also provides a lens through which China’ innovation policy formulation and 
implementation are observed.    
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Table 1. Policy variables and their narratives  













Demand-side Public procurement (ID1) Regular and strategic public procurement, shaping innovation 
directly and indirectly 
Industry-HE institution-R&D 
institution collaboration (ID2) 
Collaboration between industry, HE institution and R&D 
institution, promoting commercialization of R&D products 
International collaboration 
(ID3)  
International collaboration and exchange programs, boosting R&D 
capabilities 
Supply-side Support for MSEs and SMEs 
(IS1) 
Technological training and consultancy for MSEs and SMEs, 
improving technological infrastructure in MSEs and SMEs 
Fiscal support and subsidies 
(IS2) 
Funding and subsidies for R&D, depreciation subsidies 
Financial support (IS3) More funding channels, loans on favorable terms, insurance and 
support for risk control  
Human resources (IS4) Education and training, favored remuneration, welfare and bonus to 
attract and reward the talented domestically and overseas  
Environmental Administrative support (IE1) Streamlining procedures for approvals, easing restrictions on quotas 
and licensing, planning, organization, control and supervision of 
R&D activities      
Infrastructure support (IE2) Provision of public infrastructure and facilities in the field, 
including the internet, libraries and databases for information 
sharing  
Enhancement in intellectual 
property protection (IE3)  
Legislation and regulation for intellectual property protection, 
provision of legal services  
Standards setting (IE4) Standardization, facilitating diffusion of innovations and market 
entry   












 Generation S&T development (GG1) R&D development, product development and design 
Diffusion Transformation (GD1)  Application and promotion of new scientific and technological 
achievements, technicalization and commercialization of R&D     
Technical exports (GD2) Exports of advanced technologies to foreign territories  
Adoption  Technical absorption (GA1) Encouragement and promotion of absorption of new techniques  

















Legislature (IC1) National People’s Congress of China and its Standing Committee   
Executive (IC2) State Council of China, and are the constituents of, the state 
executive, or cabinet ministries/departments  
Bureau or agency (IC3) Non-cabinet departments 
Joint issue (IC4) Number of departments who jointly issued the policy  
Policy 
characteristics 






Table 2. Summary of policy variables 













Demand-side Public procurement (ID1) 5 1.46 
Industry-HE institution-R&D institution collaboration (ID2)  5 1.46 
International collaboration (ID3)  6 1.71 
Supply-side Support for MSEs and SMEs (IS1) 9 2.62 
Fiscal support and subsidies (IS2) 28 8.16 
Financial support (IS3) 34 9.91 
Human resources (IS4) 71 20.70 
Environmental Administrative support (IE1) 157 45.77 
Infrastructure support (IE2) 16 4.66 
Enhancement in intellectual property protection (IE3)  29 8.45 
Standards setting (IE4) 15 4.37 












 Generation S&T development (GG1) 146 42.57 
Diffusion Transformation (GD1) 60 17.49 
Technical exports (GD2) 11 3.21 
Adoption  Technical absorption (GA1) 13 3.79 

















Legislature (IC1) 11 3.21 
Executive (IC2) 294 85.71 
Bureau or agency (IC3) 22 6.41 
Joint issue (IC4) 108 31.49 
Joint issue (average number of issuers)   1.69 
Policy 
characteristics 
Degree of enforcement (PC1) (weighted average)   2.45 
 
Table 3. Policy issuances by year  
Year Total Demand side Supply side Environmental 
1990 2   1 1 
1991 69 2 36 31 
1992 57 5 22 30 
1993 1     1 
1994 4   1 3 
1995 3 1 1 1 
1996 4   1 3 
1997 3 1   2 
1998 0       
1999 15   9 6 
2000 9   5 4 
2001 6   2 4 
2002 15 2 1 12 
2003 4     4 
2004 1     1 
2005 10 2 5 4 
2006 30 2 17 11 
2007 39 5 16 18 
2008 10 1 5 4 
2009 24 3 10 11 
2010 30 1 12 17 
2011 2     2 
2012 4   2 2 




Table 4. Correlation matrix for policy instruments, objectives and implementation  
 GG1 GD1 GD2 GA1 GA2 
ID1 0.0921* -0.0560 -0.0221 -0.0024 0.0843 
ID2 0.0921* 0.0080 -0.0221 -0.0241 -0.0278 
ID3 -0.0699 0.0556 -0.0243 -0.0265 0.0720 
IS1 -0.1044† 0.0684 0.0736 -0.0326 0.0466 
IS2 0.1094† 0.0029 0.0062 0.0523 -0.0681 
IS3 0.1091† 0.0270 0.1611‡ -0.0147 -0.0757 
IS4 -0.1051* -0.1216† -0.0930* 0.0116 -0.0504 
IE1 0.0020 0.0237 0.0985* 0.0935* -0.0211 
IE2 -0.0227 -0.0291 0.0382 0.1009* -0.0505 
IE3 -0.1980‡ -0.0020 0.0042 -0.0054 -0.0694 
IE4 -0.0399 0.2393‡ -0.0389 -0.0424 -0.0488 
IE5 0.0155 0.0331 -0.0115 -0.0701 0.1334‡ 
IC1 -0.0898* -0.0403 0.0608 0.0505 0.0347 
IC2 0.0481 0.0125 -0.0203 -0.0062 0.0932* 
IC3 0.0394 0.0361 0.0874 0.0104 -0.0598 
IC4 0.0571 -0.0498 0.1673‡ 0.1249† 0.1097† 
PC1 0.0406 0.0145 0.0280 -0.0410 -0.0178 







Table 5.1. Dependant variable GG1 (S&T development) with Logit model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -0.3740 0.2931 -1.2759 0.2020 -0.9125 0.5064 -1.8019 0.0716 
IE1 0.3322 0.3216 1.0330 0.3016 0.2946 0.3275 0.8995 0.3684 
IE2 -0.1198 0.5881 -0.2037 0.8386 -0.1098 0.5896 -0.1863 0.8522 
IE3 -2.0711 0.6348 -3.2627 0.0011 -2.1871 0.6402 -3.4164 0.0006 
IE4 -0.2544 0.6190 -0.4110 0.6810 -0.2141 0.6256 -0.3423 0.7321 
IE5 0.1146 0.4089 0.2802 0.7793 0.1722 0.4258 0.4044 0.6859 
ID1 1.7603 1.1558 1.5230 0.1278 1.5519 1.1649 1.3323 0.1828 
ID2 1.5283 1.1388 1.3420 0.1796 1.4029 1.1421 1.2284 0.2193 
ID3 -1.3645 1.1292 -1.2084 0.2269 -1.4523 1.1257 -1.2901 0.1970 
IS1 -2.1716 1.0976 -1.9785 0.0479 -2.2714 1.1032 -2.0589 0.0395 
IS2 0.8810† 0.4443 1.9830 0.0474 0.8072* 0.4541 1.7776 0.0755 
IS3 0.8336* 0.4281 1.9474 0.0515 0.9643† 0.4665 2.0670 0.0387 
IS4 -0.4241 0.3515 -1.2066 0.2276 -0.4291 0.3572 -1.2014 0.2296 
IC2     0.4739 0.3812 1.2430 0.2139 
IC3     0.3184 0.5599 0.5687 0.5695 
IC4     -0.0694 0.0808 -0.8588 0.3904 
PC1     0.1013 0.1119 0.9054 0.3653 
* significant at the 10% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.1. Dependant variable GG1 (S&T development) with Poisson count model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -0.8715 0.1854 -4.6999 0.0000 -1.1528 0.3560 -3.2385 0.0012 
IE1 0.1539 0.2059 0.7473 0.4549 0.12634 0.2079 0.6079 0.5433 
IE2 -0.0562 0.4245 -0.1324 0.8946 -0.0519 0.4277 -0.1214 0.9033 
IE3 -1.5230 0.5906 -2.5787 0.0099 -1.5800 0.5926 -2.6660 0.0077 
IE4 -0.1846 0.4793 -0.3852 0.7001 -0.1702 0.4799 -0.3546 0.7229 
IE5 0.0339 0.2724 0.1245 0.9009 0.0562 0.2804 0.2004 0.8412 
ID1 0.6484 0.5333 1.2158 0.2240 0.5320 0.5429 0.9798 0.3272 
ID2 0.5331 0.5164 1.0325 0.3019 0.4711 0.5218 0.9028 0.3666 
ID3 -0.9471 1.0081 -0.9395 0.3475 -0.9941 1.0093 -0.9850 0.3246 
IS1 -1.5038 1.0141 -1.4829 0.1381 -1.5448 1.0153 -1.5216 0.1281 
IS2 0.4020 0.2702 1.4880 0.1367 0.3524 0.2753 1.2800 0.2005 
IS3 0.3732 0.2577 1.4479 0.1476 0.4198 0.2790 1.5046 0.1324 
IS4 -0.2863 0.2488 -1.1507 0.2498 -0.2960 0.2502 -1.1828 0.2369 
IC2     0.2519 0.2821 0.8931 0.3718 
IC3     0.1719 0.3785 0.4541 0.6498 
IC4     -0.0369 0.0610 -0.6048 0.5453 
PC1     0.0535 0.0809 0.6606 0.5089 










Table 5.2. Dependant variable GD1 (transformation) with Logit model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -2.0852 0.3501 -5.9561 0.0000 -2.2832 0.6539 -3.4916 0.0005 
IE1 0.5415 0.3872 1.3985 0.1620 0.5822 0.3928 1.4824 0.1382 
IE2 -0.7321 0.8864 -0.8259 0.4089 -0.8129 0.9014 -0.9018 0.3672 
IE3 0.0562 0.5440 0.1032 0.9178 -0.0485 0.5545 -0.0874 0.9303 
IE4 2.4531‡ 0.6246 3.9276 0.0001 2.5574‡ 0.6326 4.0425 0.0001 
IE5 0.5868 0.4855 1.2087 0.2268 0.7329 0.5022 1.4596 0.1444 
ID2 0.3391 1.1546 0.2937 0.7690 0.2074 1.1684 0.1775 0.8591 
ID3 1.4181 0.9197 1.5412 0.1231 1.3699 0.9263 1.4789 0.1392 
IS1 0.7891 0.8052 0.9800 0.3271 0.7347 0.8171 0.8991 0.3686 
IS2 0.3086 0.5507 0.5603 0.5752 0.3490 0.5588 0.6245 0.5323 
IS3 0.5565 0.4971 1.1195 0.2629 0.3797 0.5480 0.6929 0.4883 
IS4 -0.5936 0.4927 -1.2049 0.2282 -0.5844 0.4970 -1.1759 0.2396 
IC2     0.2273 0.5061 0.4492 0.6533 
IC3     0.9729 0.6924 1.4052 0.1600 
IC4     -0.1249 0.1229 -1.0168 0.3093 
PC1     0.0496 0.1429 0.3470 0.7286 
* significant at the 10% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.2. Dependant variable GD1 (transformation) with Poisson count model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -2.1658 0.3036 -7.1334 0.0000 -2.2969 0.5538 -4.1474 0.0000 
IE1 0.4181 0.3307 1.2640 0.2062 0.4522 0.3360 1.3459 0.1783 
IE2 -0.6063 0.7807 -0.7766 0.4374 -0.6735 0.7883 -0.8544 0.3929 
IE3 0.0549 0.4931 0.1114 0.9113 -0.0272 0.5004 -0.0544 0.9566 
IE4 1.6205‡ 0.4345 3.7293 0.0002 1.6947‡ 0.4393 3.8574 0.0001 
IE5 0.4602 0.4263 1.0797 0.2803 0.5808 0.4412 1.3162 0.1881 
ID2 0.2754 1.0215 0.2696 0.7874 0.1750 1.0314 0.1696 0.8653 
ID3 1.0760 0.7415 1.4505 0.1469 1.0375 0.7460 1.3907 0.1643 
IS1 0.6122 0.6560 0.9333 0.3507 0.5749 0.6677 0.8611 0.3892 
IS2 0.2328 0.4847 0.4803 0.6310 0.2743 0.4927 0.5567 0.5777 
IS3 0.4336 0.4338 0.9995 0.3175 0.2780 0.4775 0.5821 0.5605 
IS4 -0.5376 0.4544 -1.1831 0.2368 -0.5279 0.4575 -1.1540 0.2485 
IC2     0.1591 0.4338 0.3667 0.7139 
IC3     0.7779 0.6046 1.2865 0.1983 
IC4     -0.1008 0.1108 -0.9098 0.3629 
PC1     0.0357 0.1251 0.2857 0.7751 






Table 5.3. Dependant variable GD2 (technical exports) with Logit model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -5.6175 0.9739 -5.7679 0.0000 -7.3837 1.8904 -3.9058 0.0001 
IE1 2.4196† 0.9553 2.5327 0.0113 2.1516† 0.9909 2.1714 0.0299 
IE2 0.3196 1.2674 0.2522 0.8009 0.6673 1.3136 0.5080 0.6114 
IE3 -0.0808 1.1106 -0.0727 0.9420 0.2887 1.1594 0.2490 0.8034 
IE5 -1.2006 1.9512 -0.6153 0.5383 -1.4515 2.0444 -0.7100 0.4777 
IS1 1.4116 1.3447 1.0497 0.2939 1.6008 1.4058 1.1387 0.2548 
IS2 0.7816 1.7656 0.4427 0.6580 1.0200 1.7331 0.5885 0.5562 
IS3 3.0337‡ 0.9851 3.0796 0.0021 3.4435‡ 1.2072 2.8525 0.0043 
IC2     0.3638 1.1347 0.3206 0.7485 
IC3     -0.5198 1.2195 -0.4263 0.6699 
IC4     0.3280† 0.1307 2.5101 0.0121 
PC1     0.2992 0.3658 0.8180 0.4134 
* significant at the 10% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.3. Dependant variable GD2 (technical exports) with Poisson count model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -5.3731 0.8430 -6.3735 0.0000 -6.9812 1.7623 -3.9614 0.0001 
IE1 2.1103‡ 0.8107 2.6031 0.0092 1.7593† 0.8177 2.1516 0.0314 
IE2 0.2934 1.2132 0.2419 0.8089 0.6685 1.2418 0.5383 0.5904 
IE3 -0.0544 1.0892 -0.0500 0.9601 0.2864 1.1344 0.2525 0.8007 
IE5 -1.0280 1.7586 -0.5846 0.5588 -1.1963 1.7955 -0.6663 0.5052 
IS1 1.2823 1.2574 1.0198 0.3078 1.4656 1.3102 1.1186 0.2633 
IS2 0.6148 1.6487 0.3729 0.7092 0.7600 1.5754 0.4824 0.6295 
IS3 2.6350‡ 0.7988 3.2988 0.0010 2.9891‡ 1.0373 2.8815 0.0040 
IC2     0.5191 1.0782 0.4815 0.6302 
IC3     -0.6079 1.1671 -0.5209 0.6025 
IC4     0.2860† 0.1176 2.4321 0.0150 
PC1     0.2484 0.3382 0.7343 0.4628 






Table 5.4. Dependant variable GA1 (technical absorption) with Logit model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -4.6066 0.6987 -6.5935 0.0000 -4.1840 1.0850 -3.8562 0.0001 
IE1 1.6169† 0.7204 2.2444 0.0248 1.6424† 0.7647 2.1477 0.0317 
IE2 1.5167* 0.8383 1.8092 0.0704 1.9212† 0.8860 2.1683 0.0301 
IE3 -0.4528 1.0907 -0.4151 0.6780 0.1120 1.1277 0.0993 0.9209 
IS2 1.3708 0.9033 1.5175 0.1291 1.8297* 0.9628 1.9003 0.0574 
IS3 -0.1366 1.1739 -0.1163 0.9074 -0.4731 1.2890 -0.3670 0.7136 
IS4 0.9385 0.7836 1.1977 0.2310 1.1123 0.7962 1.3969 0.1624 
IC2     -0.7212 0.9534 -0.7565 0.4494 
IC3     -0.9641 1.4140 -0.6819 0.4953 
IC4     0.3687‡ 0.1270   2.9038 0.0037 
PC1     -0.3105 0.2863 -1.0841 0.2783 
* significant at the 10% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.4. Dependant variable GA1 (technical absorption) with Poisson count model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -4.5362 0.6539 -6.9368 0.0000 -4.1334 1.0453 -3.9542 0.0001 
IE1 1.4880† 0.6722 2.2136 0.0269 1.4752† 0.7171 2.0570 0.0397 
IE2 1.3861* 0.7786 1.7803 0.0750 1.7179† 0.8096 2.1219 0.0338 
IE3 -0.4195 1.0636 -0.3944 0.6933 0.0955 1.0920 0.0875 0.9303 
IS2 1.2334 0.8413 1.4662 0.1426 1.6651* 0.9010 1.8481 0.0646 
IS3 -0.1579 1.1055 -0.1428 0.8864 -0.4822 1.2043 -0.4004 0.6889 
IS4 0.8387 0.7377 1.1369 0.2556 1.0065 0.7522 1.3381 0.1809 
IC2     -0.6535 0.9095 -0.7185 0.4724 
IC3     -0.6748 1.2510 -0.5394 0.5896 
IC4     0.2915‡ 0.0950 3.0685 0.0022 
PC1     -0.2528 0.2642 -0.9571 0.3385 







Table 5.5. Dependant variable GA2 (technical imports) with Logit model  
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -3.4780 0.5464 -6.3656 0.0000 -3.8291 0.8152 -4.6973 0.0000 
IE1 0.3344 0.6319 0.5292 0.5967 0.3234 0.6518 0.4961 0.6198 
IE5 1.5600† 0.6819 2.2879 0.0221 1.5341† 0.6990 2.1945 0.0282 
ID1 2.0917* 1.2444 1.6809 0.0928 2.3542* 1.2928 1.8211 0.0686 
ID3 1.9458* 1.1776 1.6523 0.0985 2.1542* 1.1890 1.8118 0.0700 
IS1 0.6696 1.1309 0.5920 0.5538 0.8735 1.1528 0.7577 0.4486 
IS4 -0.4839 0.8106 -0.5970 0.5505 -0.3787 0.8200 -0.4618 0.6442 
IC4     0.2056* 0.1168 1.7606 0.0783 
PC1     -0.0345 0.2431 -0.1418 0.8872 
* significant at the 10% level; † significant at the 5% level; ‡ significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.5. Dependant variable GA2 (technical imports) with Poisson count model 
 Simple model Mediated model 
 Coef Std. error z-stat p-value Coef Std. error z-stat p-value 
C -3.5070 0.5310 -6.6047 0.0000 -3.8286 0.7845 -4.8803 0.0000 
IE1 0.31978 0.6106 0.5236 0.6005 0.3057 0.6313 0.4843 0.6282 
IE5 1.4483† 0.6507 2.2259 0.0260 1.4226† 0.6675 2.1312 0.0331 
ID1 1.8975* 1.1322 1.6759 0.0938 2.1383* 1.1811 1.8104 0.0702 
ID3 1.7764* 1.0754 1.6519 0.0986 1.9715* 1.0895 1.8096 0.0704 
IS1 0.5980 1.0493 0.5699 0.5688 0.7944 1.0784 0.7367 0.4613 
IS4 -0.4567 0.7837 -0.5827 0.5601 -0.3562 0.7943 -0.4485 0.6538 
IC4     0.1860* 0.1061 1.7541 0.0794 
PC1     -0.0310 0.2332 -0.1331 0.8941 








Table 7. Most Innovative Companies 2015  
Rank BCG MIT Technology Review 
1 Apple Tesla Motors 
2 Google Xiaomi 
3 Tesla Motors Illumina 
4 Microsoft Corp. Alibaba 
5 Samsung Group Counsyl 
6 Toyota SunEdison 
7 BMW Tencent 
8 Gilead Sciences Juno Therapeutics 
9 Amazon SolarCity 
10 Daimler Netflix 
11 Bayer OvaScience 
12 Tencent Google 
13 IBM Amazon 
14 SoftBank AliveCor 
15 Fast Retailing Gilead Sciences 
16 Yahoo! Apple 
17 Blogen Voxel8 
18 The Walt Disney Company IDE Technologies 
19 Marriott International Amgen 
20 Johnson & Johnson Aquion Energy 
21 Netflix Baidu 
22 AXA SpaceX 
23 Hewlett-Packard Sakti3 
24 Amgen Freescale Semiconductor 
25 Allianz Universal Robots 
26 Tata Motors Bristol-Myers Squibb 
27 General Electric Teladoc 
28 Facebook Nvidia 
29 BASF Facebook 
30 Siemens Alnylam 
31 Cisco Systems Rethink Robotics 
32 Dow Chemical Company Philips 
33 Renault Cellectis 
34 Fidelity Investments Bluebird Bio 
35 Volkswagen ThyssenKrupp 
36 Visa Slack 
37 Dupont Line 
38 Hitachi Improbable 
39 Roche Enlitic 
40 3M Coinbase 
41 NEC HaCon 
42 Medtronic 3D Systems 
43 JPMorgan Chase Generali 
44 Pfizer Intrexon 
45 Huawei DNAnexus 
46 Nike IBM 
47 BT Group Snapchat 
48 MasterCard Microsoft 
49 Salesforce.com Imprint Energy 
50 Lenovo Uber 


















































































































































































S&T development - GG1 
Technical exports - GD2 
Transformation - GD1 
Technical absorption - GA1 
Technical imports - GA2 
 
IS2 - Fiscal support and subsidies 
IS3 - Financial support 
IE1 - Administrative support 
IE2 - Infrastructure support 
IE4 - Standards setting 
IE5 - Tax incentives 
ID3 - International collaboration 
ID1 - Public procurement 
 
